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For the Geopolitics Lecture at the Association of American
Geographers Annual Meeting 2010, the paper examines the core
features of Mackinder’s geopolitical imaginary, reviews contem-
porary challenges to those elements and develops an alternative
conception of space for a Progressive Geopolitics.
INTRODUCTION
Having spent about thirty years on the research that went into a book subti-
tled, ‘The Legacy of Halford Mackinder,’ to be then asked within a month of
its publication to give a lecture entitled, ‘Beyond the Legacy of Mackinder,’
seemed a little harsh.1 Nevertheless, it is an honour to have been asked
to deliver a lecture for the journal Geopolitics, so today, I will accept the
challenge and explore how we might indeed move beyond the legacy of
Mackinder. I’m going to identify six elements of the geographical imagi-
nary that is at the heart of Mackinder’s work and which in turn explains
why Mackinder continues to be drawn upon by some of those engaged
in foreign policy debates. Then I’m going to suggests ways that these six
elements were challenged by some of his contemporaries and through this
not only to show that the particular context in which Mackinder worked
although very important for understanding his ideas did not determine what
those ideas were. Although some positivist philosophers might demur, there
remained questions of moral, ethical and political choice involved in the
type of Geography that Mackinder produced and by extension there are still
those questions in the type of Geography that we produce.2 I am then going
to comment on the ways that these challenges to Mackinder are still perti-
nent, in a slightly different way, for the understanding of Geopolitics today.
I will finish with some brief reflections on the nature of space within the
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alternative geopolitical imaginary, a Progressive Geopolitics (Kearns, 2009,
ch. 9), which might emerge from these challenges.3
THE ELEMENTS OF MACKINDER’S GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINARY
The six elements that are at the heart of Mackinder’ geopolitical works can
be thought of as six patterns that when overlain produce the kaleidoscopic
forms of international relations. The first is the geographical distribution of
resources. Mackinder’s work begins with his observation that resources are
often clustered in space. This produces a geographical unevenness in the
capacity for development and for the expression of geopolitical and military
power. We all know that the central argument made by Mackinder was that
there was a valuable and extensive set of resources located in a part of
the world not easily accessible from the open seas. This region comprises
western Russia, southwards to the Caspian and then eastwards through the
Russian steppes and embraces a region rich in agricultural potential and
mineral deposits. Putting these agricultural and industrial resources together
you have the fuel for a likely aspirant to global hegemony. Mackinder’s
claim was that if adequately developed this region, the Heartland of the
World Island, could sustain a World Empire. This argument is still made
by such Russo-phobes as Paul Wolfowitz, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew
Brzezinski.4 Kissinger and Brzezinski explicitly evoke Mackinder in making
their argument that this Heartland supplies the resources that tempt Russia
to bid for global domination.5
The second element of the spatial imaginary of Mackinder is contiguity,
or the argument that influence spreads and is felt most strongly near at hand
and more weakly at a distance, the power of contagion. In this case, then,
we have a Heartland that can sustain productive and military power, and this
power will be extended until it reaches the sphere of influence, the spreading
power, of another neighbour equally strong, or until the spreading influence
reaches some other effective barrier. On this basis, Mackinder argued that
the Heartland comprehended not only the immediate resource base but all
areas over which a power situate within it might extend its influence. In this
case, he extended the Heartland to include all lands draining into the Black
Sea since this proximate area could be controlled by moving into this terri-
tory and then occupying the shores of the straits of the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles. Similar logic encouraged Mackinder to extend the Heartland to
include the lands draining into the Baltic since no comparable land power
lay between Western Russia and the coastlands of eastern Denmark and
southern Sweden, the shores of the Skaggerak strait and the lands needed
if one wished to close access to the Baltic. The argument from contiguity is
central to Mackinder because it makes what happens in one place danger-
ous to other places. For example, when Mackinder was trying to persuade
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Beyond the Legacy of Mackinder 919
the British government to invade Bolshevik Russia in 1920 the argument he
used was that Bolshevism was like a ‘prairie fire’ and if not stopped it would
continue in all directions threatening even British rule in India. In short, the
British must invade Russia in order to avert the loss of India.6 The argu-
ment from contiguity is also evident in the modern geopolitical imaginary,
as, for example, with the so-called domino theory, such a prominent part
of Cold War paranoia.7 In the hands of a Cold War ideologue like Richard
Nixon, there was really very little constraint on how far this chain of influ-
ence might extend, reaching of course within the United States itself to its
own fifth column of Soviet or Chinese dupes.
The third element of Mackinder’s world view is interconnectedness, for
as Mackinder put it in 1914, ‘Today we have almost annihilated space.’8
He proposed that the world was so inter-connected that distance no longer
provided protection against the effects of distant events. Mackinder drew an
analogy with the physical effects of the eruption of Krakatoa (1883), after
which the dust cloud circled the earth. He suggested that political change
was like this eruption for dramatic events in one place had consequences
for everywhere else. What this meant was that there was no such thing as
a limited sphere of national interest. Each country’s national interest was
engaged by events everywhere else in the world. This again is central to
modern geopolitical argument although where Mackinder spoke of closed
space, modern theorists speak of globalisation. Globalisation means that we
are living in one world, a single world, and that we can’t ignore things that
happen in distant places. Tony Blair was explicit: ‘The basic thesis is that the
defining characteristic of today’s world is its interdependence . . . and that
unless we articulate a common global policy based on common values, we
risk chaos threatening our stability . . . . The consequence of this thesis is
a policy of engagement not isolation; and one that is active not reactive.’9
In places where Western values do not reach, unfreedom breeds terrorism,
and thus these places beyond the current reach of Western values pose too
serious a threat to be left alone. Globalisation, or the interconnectedness
of the world, is actually an alibi for universal intervention, countries can
intervene anywhere and plead national interest.
The fourth element of Mackinder’s geopolitical imaginary was that the
world was essentially a choropleth map, comprising large territories that
could be coloured differently: black or white, red or blue, yellow or brown.
This map reflected the fact that, according to Mackinder, the world consisted
of large spatial units that are internally relatively homogeneous while being
radically different from their equally homogeneous neighbours. This is a
vision of absolute space and it sustains the notion that the world consists of
geographically discrete and separated civilisations (or possibly cultures, or
possibly races), and that these things are so radically different, each from the
others, that they pose an existential threat to each other.10 It is not, then, just a
zero-sum game about competition for resources but, rather, the flourishing of
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one particular human group is a threat to the flourishing of others. For each
civilisation, the conception of freedom, the conception of the good life, is so
at variance with that of other civilisations that if one civilisation prevails the
others must die out. Mackinder said that if, against the challenge of the Slavic
and other races, the Anglo-Saxon race did not prevail, then the Anglo-Saxons
would become a people who existed in the world purely ‘on sufferance.’11
The same thing is present in the modern geopolitical imaginary for many
believe that there are certain conceptions of the good life, of ways of being
in the world, that are so incompatible that they cannot co-exist or thrive
alongside each other. They pose a radical threat to each other’s possibility
of existence. This is characteristic of Huntington’s account of the clash of
civilisations where he suggests that all existing civilisations are aggressive,
apart from one.12 He asserts that Islam, in particular, has ‘bloody borders.’13
In other words, these civilisations, based on religion in Huntington’s reading,
constitute divergent ways of living and while they exist in different parts of
the world, they ever have an appetite for expansion. Each faces the same
existential choice: prevail or go under.
The fifth element of this geographical imagination was the claim that the
interaction between these radically separate civilisations was primarily based
on force. Mackinder was dismissive of pacificism: ‘We have had enough of
that wishy-washy philanthropy.’14 In order to survive, civilisations have to
grow and to do this they must ever challenge each other through war and
rumours of war. They only survive through strength. This claim is at the heart
of modern realist International Relations theory, which asserts that force, or
power, is at the heart of the relations between the Great Powers.15
Finally, and fortunately for the well-being of humanity, not all these
civilisations were equal. There was one that was different. The sixth element
of the global space described by Mackinder is the idea of exceptionalism.
One of these civilisations had a global and not purely indigenous role as
the carrier and bearer of truly universal values. For Mackinder, this was
the Anglo-Saxon race, which he saw as the source of democratic values
in his world. Writing in the early twentieth century, Mackinder suggested
that democracy and freedom were universal goods that depended upon the
strength of the civilisation which produced and grounded them. In 1916 he
asserted that ‘the defence of Freedom and Democracy in the world at large
must rest finally on the strength and, in the days that are coming, on the
instant readiness of the British Empire.’16 The other parts of the world had
values that were inimical to this. This gave Britain, the British Empire, the
Anglo-Saxon race (and these were conflated) a global mission that was not
only about their own survival but was also about the survival of the best
prospects for human development. This form of exceptionalism is equally
evident today.17 In his initial response to the attacks on the United States
of 11 September 2001, George Bush asserted that ‘America was targeted for
attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the
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Beyond the Legacy of Mackinder 921
world.’18 The defence of the United States is thus the interest of all people of
good will, as Bush remarked in his 2003 State of the Union speech, ‘we are
called to defend the safety of our people and the hopes of all mankind.’19
In the case of Bush, the exceptionalism of the United States is divine in
origin as he made clear in the same speech of 2003: ‘The liberty we prize
is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity.’20 In other
words, the promotion of freedom by the United States is a universal and not
a national project. You have, then, a global mission that is not only about
national survival but is about the survival of civilisation as such. The choice
is civilisation or barbarism, the United States or its terrorist enemies.
These, then, are the six elements of Mackinder’s geopolitical imaginary
and they add up to a distinctive account of global geography. The geography
of resources produces concentrations of geopolitical potential that in partic-
ular promises to a land-power based in Russia the prospect of extensive
military reach and the temptation of global reach. It produces a vision of the
contagious effect of unfreedom threatening first neighbours but ultimately,
through the interconnectedness of all places, the freedom of the entire globe.
It is a geopolitical imaginary that insists that the world is made up of mutu-
ally hostile civilisational blocs. Yet it is a geographical imaginary in which
there is one group that is more equal than others. The West, understood in
racial, cultural or religious terms is presented as special and perhaps naïve in
not realising how unlike it are the other civilisations. Huntington insists that
the West is uniquely and dangerously pacific. Only this civilisation has ever
freely given up weapons and we now see, according to Huntington, ‘a new
form of arms competition’ but whereas ‘in an old-fashioned arms race, each
side developed its own arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the
other side. In this new form of arms competition, one side is developing
its arms and the other side is attempting not to balance but to limit and
prevent that arms build-up while at the same time reducing its own military
capabilities.’21
THE CHALLENGES TO MACKINDER’S GEOPOLITICS
We can certainly understand Mackinder’s ideas in terms of his political and
intellectual context. We can look at the threat to British economic superiority
posed by the industrialisation of Japan, Germany, and the United States.
We can look at the challenge presented to British colonialism by nationalist
movements in Egypt, India, and Ireland. We can identify a whole set of
anxieties that were characteristic of domestic debate in Britain at the time
Mackinder wrote. There were anxieties about racial degeneration and indeed
the British parliament set up an Interdepartmental Committee on Physical
Deterioration, which reported in 1904.22 In those anxious times, Mackinder
set out a vision of how Britain could maintain its global primacy, could
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remain master of its own destiny. It is also obvious why such a set of ideas
should find echoes among those who take up a similar challenge in our
times, the challenge of preserving the global reach that the United States was
able to establish in the decade that followed the end of the Second World
War. These people wish, in Krauthammer’s terms, to prolong that Unipolar
Moment when the United States, having seen off the challenge of the Soviet
Union faced a world without a realistic rival.23 The goal of these strategists
was to devise policies ensuring that the United States faced no credible rival
in any part of the world, a condition that the National Security Strategy of
2002 referred to as ‘full spectrum dominance.’24
If we want instead to devise a different sort of world, one in which
international relations are not based alone on force, are not the expression of
national chauvinisms, do not serve to ensure the unfair exploitation of some
peoples by others, then we will certainly have to go beyond the legacy
of Mackinder. One way of doing so is to recall that even at the time that
Mackinder was writing, there were alternative geographical imaginaries in
development. I will now describe some of these alternatives and gesture
towards some modern echoes.
First, then, let me turn to the question of the uneven geography of
resources, presented by Mackinder as offering a provocation to the assem-
bling and contesting of world empires. Here we might attend to the very
different account of empires and imperialism offered by Mackinder’s con-
temporary, the Liberal journalist, John Hobson whose Imperialism: A Study
was taken up enthusiastically by Lenin.25 Hobson looked at the contexts of
resource extraction and the actions of mining companies, rubber conglom-
erates, and logging firms. Rather than examining how resources sustain local
states, Hobson described instead the circumstances under which through
coercive labour relations those resources were liberated from their places
of production before being appropriated to economic development in the
colonial metropole. Hobson, then, took the question of natural resources
as the occasion for reflecting, not upon the possibility of empires arising
to challenge Britain, but rather for reflecting upon the brutal treatment of
indigenous workers and the unfair terms of trade. Where Mackinder treated
resources as the basis for local development, Hobson in contrast focused
upon how and with what consequences they enter the world economy. This
produces a rather different vision prioritising an Economic rather than a
Political Geography.
There is a significant ethical difference between Mackinder and Hobson
in relation to resource extraction. The issue for Hobson is not that the con-
centration of resources produced a concentration of power but, instead, that
a significant concentration of resources created the prospect that private
companies would pervert international relations lobbying colonial powers
to make wars and acquire colonies. These colonies provide those compa-
nies with ideal circumstances in which to exploit labour, acquire resources
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Beyond the Legacy of Mackinder 923
on the cheap, and yet meet few of the social and environmental costs of
their extractive activities. For Hobson, although colonial wars are presented
in the metropole as being in the national interest of the colonial power in
fact these wars serve rather the private interests of the mining companies
and other extractive enterprises. This is still a pertinent point. It is not self-
evident that what is good for General Motors is indeed good for the United
States, to take the claim made by Charles Wilson as CEO of General Motors
when being confirmed as simultaneously US Secretary of State for Defense.
Hobson argued that the extractive industries devoted much attention to pro-
paganda so that imperialistic jingoism might sustain the military campaigns
that they wanted for their own commercial reasons.
Let me turn now to the second of the elements of Mackinder’s
geopolitical imaginary, the notion of contiguity, or spatial contagion. There
are two interesting contemporary challenges to this assumption. The first was
raised in discussion after Mackinder’s 1904 paper on the Geographical Pivot
of History. Leopold Amery, whose views on imperialism were very close to
Mackinder’s own, said that Mackinder’s account of the land power that could
make a bid for world empire on the basis of the Heartland, was about to be
left behind by the development of air power. The strategic significance of
holding territory, of defending it with fortified borders or occupying it with
lines of trenches, would be dramatically changed by the use of airplanes
which could simply hop over the lot and thus, he suggested, ‘a great deal of
this geographical distribution [discussed by Mackinder] must lose its impor-
tance . . . . It will not matter whether they are in the centre of a continent or
on an island; those people who have the industrial power and the power of
invention and of science will be able to defeat all others.’26 Air power would
render contiguity moot in ways that have current echoes in discussions of
Network War.27
More fundamental than Amery’s speculations about air power, were the
arguments of Arthur Balfour in the British Cabinet when in 1919 it was dis-
cussing the intervention in South Russia that George Curzon and Winston
Churchill were advocating.28 Curzon, in particular, presented an argument
rather like the prairie fire analogy offered by Mackinder. The British had to
invade South Russia to displace a regime that threatened to expand as far
as, and then into, India. Balfour highlighted the grandiosity and unceasing
expansionism of the argument from contiguity: ‘Every time I come to a dis-
cussion . . . I find there is a new sphere which we have got to guard, which
is supposed to protect the gateways of India. Those gateways are getting
further and further from India, and I do not know how far west they are
going to be brought.’29 There really does not seem to be any principled way
of limiting the spatial reach of the argument from continuity.
The third element of Mackinder’s geopolitical imaginary is interconnect-
edness; the claim that the world was so well integrated that the national
interest of the Great Powers extended to every part of the globe. Elisée
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Reclus accepted that the world was now one society but he argued that
while the national interest did now extend to all parts of the world, this
was not a military but an ethical imperative. He focused not on national
vulnerability but upon national responsibility. Everywhere in the world had
been transformed by Western countries’ pursuit of national interest and it
was now time to accept responsibility for these effects. The translation of
resources into commodities changed environments. Through global trade,
relationships were established that created interdependence and grounded
our duty towards distant strangers.30 It is not that we have an interest in peo-
ple in distant places because what they do may affect us, it is, rather, that we
have a responsibility because we have already affected them. So, the arrow
is reversed.
The fourth element I want to consider is incompatibility, the idea that
the world is made up of discrete civilisations locked in endless mortal com-
bat. There were two ways that this claim was challenged by some among
Mackinder’s contemporaries. In the first place, there were those who argued
that humanity was essentially one race, the human race, ab uno sanguine, of
one blood, in the motto of one contemporary anti-colonial pressure group,
the Aborigines’ Protection Society.31 In other words, racial differentiation
was a biological lie. This position related to a contemporary academic con-
troversy about whether the human race evolved from a common source or
whether, instead, the separate races were the product of independent bio-
logical descent, or parallel evolution.32 The monogenist versus polygenist
debate did not settle the ethical question of how to treat distant peoples but,
in the hands of the anti-imperialists, the monogenist argument was deployed
to argue that a common humanity implied equality of respect. The accep-
tance of radical difference between races invited perfidious reflections upon
superiority and duplicitous and patronising strategies of colonial rule in the
name of guardianship.
The second contemporary attack upon incompatibility came from Peter
Kropótkin.33 In the first place, argued Kropótkin, the suggestion that peoples
or cultures were internally homogeneous was nonsense. Each part of the
world had been so shaped by interaction with other parts that each was
already hybrid. There was no purity from which to begin. Furthermore, far
from being incompatible, far from having interests essentially hostile, the
various peoples of the world had the possibility of recognising their common
humanity in the face of famine, in the face of threats to the survival of
forests. Environmental stewardship was a common, long-term interest even
if not, for certain groups, a short-term or local interest. In Mackinder’s own
day, then, there were humanitarian and environmentalist arguments against
the incompatibility thesis and each rested upon a radical rethinking of the
implications of interconnectedness.
Now to the fifth of Mackinder’s guiding principles; that societies inter-
acted primarily through the exercise or the threat of force within a zero-sum
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Beyond the Legacy of Mackinder 925
game where if I get something you have lost it, and if I prevail you must
go under. Élisée Reclus in the magnificent set of volumes he published at
the end of his life, L’Homme et la Terre, when he was no longer a pen
for hire but was writing simply to suit himself, gave a coruscating account
of the geography of colonialism.34 One of the things that Reclus suggested
throughout these volumes was that the interaction between different peoples
was actually the source of intellectual, social, and economic energy. It was,
for example, precisely through the interaction of Asia and Europe that the
flourishing of Ancient Greece was nurtured. It was hybridity and contact
that fertilised. The relations, not of force but of mutual learning, drove the
development of science, technology, and culture. For his part, Kropótkin
went further, arguing that the fundamental basis of all progress was cooper-
ation rather than conflict, that conflict was profligate while cooperation was
fruitful. According to Kropótkin, the social force of cooperation was at the
heart of the creation of language. Humanity was essentially a social being
and by expanding and articulating that sociability over ever broader spaces
development was stimulated. So, Reclus proposed that energy came from the
contact between diverse peoples, while Kropótkin suggested that progress
came from extending the spatial scale of sociability. This is very different
from Mackinder’s view of a world held together by arms-length relations of
conflict and competition.
Finally, to turn to the question of exceptionalism. Many of the thinkers
who challenged the assumptions of Mackinder’s geopolitical imaginary
thought long and hard about exceptionalism. Several of them, Hobson,
Reclus, Kropótkin, occasionally fell into versions of arguments about
advanced and backward peoples, although each modulated in some way
the typical arrogance of such a claim. Reclus argued that the gap between
European and Asian civilisations was a rather recent development and that
in previous times the gradient had run the other way. For Reclus, there
was nothing particularly European about the nature of European dominance.
Reclus proposed that in 1491 it was not evident which were more advanced,
the societies of Europe or those of South America. So, Reclus develops an
argument about the historical contingency of European supremacy. Unlike
Mackinder, he saw nothing special about Europe beyond the geographical
accident that it rather than Asia secured the resources of the New World. This
of course finds an insistent modern echo in the work of Jim Blaut.35 More
radical yet were the reflections of Mary Kingsley, a geographer and anthro-
pologist who visited and wrote about West Africa.36 Within her ironic texts
there is a functionalist account of culture that asks whether cultural differ-
ence might reflect nothing more than different local needs. By starting from
the sceptical position that there was little evident superiority only varying
adaptations to different local circumstances, Kingsley articulated a greater
respect for indigenous culture. This is an important methodological principle
but it also invites us to reflect upon how we might learn from peoples who
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have lived in balance with and respect for other non-human living things in
ways that Western societies have unlearned.
THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF THE CHALLENGES TO
MACKINDER: A NEW CONCEPTION OF SPACE FOR
PROGRESSIVE GEOPOLITICS
There are five features of these challenges to Mackinder that I think can
be drawn upon to develop a new conception of space for a Progressive
Geopolitics. First, there are more than states. The world does not consist
only of a choropleth map of states, even if aggregated into civilisations as
Huntington does in The Clash of Civilizations.37 In the first place, there are a
whole set of non-state actors that matter from transnational institutions such
as the Roman Catholic Church, multinational companies, or global NGOs.
In the second place, there are significant and important parts of the world
that are beyond states or only weakly and problematically integrated into
them. I am thinking not only of Antarctica, but also of Zomia, an upland area
of South-east Asia, stretching across parts of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma,
India, Pakistan, Tibet and Afghanistan, and inhabited by tribal peoples con-
tinuing to resist the internal colonialism of state-building, and I am also
thinking of those many indigenous peoples who struggle to retain or recreate
spaces of albeit compromised and fragile autonomy within territories claimed
by nation-states.38 There are estimates that one in twenty-five of the world’s
people can be described as indigenous, having some degree of autonomy
from the global nation-states system.39 It is further estimated that they have
stewardship of about one-fifth of the earth’s land, perhaps the ‘greatest
remaining sanctuaries of life on earth, . . . biological arks.’40 The indige-
nous peoples have care for perhaps the last reservoir of non-commodified
resources. In the long story of the proletarianisation of peoples, this indige-
nous redout is not only a majestic source of non-capitalist reasoning, but
also now humanity’s last best hope for the preservation of species diversity.
The first element of a conception of space that might serve a Progressive
Geopolitics might be respect for the distinctiveness and fragility of indige-
nous stewardship of this 20% of the earth’s land, currently under threat from
the modern versions of those companies that Hobson saw extending com-
modification and colonialism into the resource-rich lands of the tropics. They
are still at it.
A second element of this alternative conception of space is that it accepts
that the territories of the world are essentially porous.41 Clearly that’s true of
air pollution, clearly that’s true at the level of microbes; for example, AIDS
was identified in 1981 and by 1986 almost every country in the world had
reported cases. There’s a fantastic illustration of these porous boundaries in
James Joyce’s Ulysses. British chauvinism included a thick streak of linguistic
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Beyond the Legacy of Mackinder 927
nationalism. The British celebrated English as the language of Shakespeare
and as grounding a national literature that embodied the highest values of
British culture, although by and large they meant English culture. English
education included edited collections of the best examples of English prose,
a genealogy of the English. As the Professor of Poetry at Oxford explained
in 1900, it ‘should be the aim . . . of the Universities to maintain the standard
of purity in the English language. In our school of English Language and
Literature at least as it might be the student may learn to trace from age to
age the development of our tongue, and to observe the flexibility with which
its character has adapted itself to the gradual changes in our national life and
society.’42
In the fourteenth chapter of Ulysses, often referred to as the Oxen of
the Sun after the episode from Homer’s Odyssey to which it refers, Joyce
satirises these English primers. He divides the chapter into sections each of
which is written in a different style of English so that they form a sort of
roll-call of English writers, or rather of writers in English for very many of
the examples Joyce takes are either evidently derived from other languages,
Latin and courtly French for example, or are parodies of the style of writers
who were born or lived outside England, in Ireland for example. The final
sections of the chapter include examples that draw upon the Bowery slang
of contemporary African-Americans, as if the story of the development of
English had now flown the national coop. But the chapter comments on the
purity question in two other ways. First, it is set in a maternity hospital and
the topics with which it deals follow the process of conception, gestation and
birth. The foreign particle, or sperm, who enters the womb of the hospital
is an alien: ‘Some man that wayfaring was stood by housedoor at night’s
oncoming. Of Israel’s folk was that man that on earth wandering far had
fared.’43 The womb can only be fertilised by something foreign to itself, the
germ or seed. In the second place, this man, Leopold Bloom, is presented
as rejected by those who might style themselves pure Irish, on grounds of
religion incorrectly imputed on the basis of his ethnicity. Yet it is the convert
Bloom who behaves like the true Christian to Mrs. Purefoy, the woman
upstairs unattended during her long day and night of labour pains.
Since language is a tool of communication it will develop in the inter-
stices where peoples meet. It is always a bridging and thus a hybrid
enterprise, but then so are most social and cultural units, including those that
announce themselves unrealistically as having territorial limits. This poros-
ity is a source of great hope. It is at the heart of attempts at arms control.
Because each of the super-powers was unable to exclude the possibility
that the other would penetrate its space with missiles, each had to reassure
the other that it would not launch a strike because even accidents and mis-
understandings might trigger mutual destruction. We are unable to render
our territory inviolate and thus we must moderate our threat of using force
and one way of showing this intention is to scale back deployment.44 Our
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vulnerability each to the other, what Butler calls the ‘precarity’ of life, pro-
vides the basis for agreeing upon arms control and since nuclear weapons, at
least, are very hard to hide, the porosity of boundaries is intrinsic to the verifi-
cation procedures that reassure parties to arms control agreements.45 Creating
boundaries that seem to defy porosity in fact makes the world less safe. The
Star Wars, or Strategic Defense Initiative, was precisely such a project. Insofar
as it promised protection against incoming missiles, it allowed first strike to
be contemplated without apprehension of Armageddon, at least not at home.
At least as regards the behaviour of states, vulnerability and transparency
encourage limiting the use or threat of force. Porosity is our friend.
A third element of a new conception of space is the importance of local
conditions. The idea of contagion invited us to focus upon the spread of
influence and thus to focus upon the source of change in any one terri-
tory as coming from outside, as being propagated into a place rather as a
seed is broadcast into soil. To counter the paranoid geography that this can
produce, we might recall the importance of the soil. In the first place, this
means acknowledging that there is a geography of social vulnerability or
political receptivity that means that even where the source of change is an
external influence the nature of local change depends upon local factors. For
example, while the interconnectedness of the world certainly explains why
AIDS was reported so quickly from all parts of the world very shortly after
its first identification, the geography of origins is of little value in explaining
the geography of impact. To know where HIV will go, the trajectory across
space is less useful than an understanding of the distribution of vulnerability.
AIDS waxes in spaces of marginalised people.
The second way that local conditions are important is that the conta-
gious perspective can make people misprise proximate causes. The domino
theory of the Cold War encouraged people to perceive the sources of politi-
cal change as external to countries, as being about the introduction of alien
communism into virgin territories. Yet socialist values can, as Marx predicted,
be elaborated out of the immediate experience of capitalist labour relations.
Furthermore, there are reasons other than communist economic planning for
a country to nationalise and direct its local resources. There were nation-
alist and not only communist projects of economic autarky.46 Attending to
the local causes of political change should caution against recruiting local
struggles into overarching global projects and prevent us magnifying the
significance of political change in any one place.
The fourth element of a new conception of space must be that it recog-
nises no strong separation between here and there; there is already here. The
porosity of boundaries is reflected both in economic relations and cultural
identities. In this respect Reclus is right, we have geographical obligations in
consequence of the harm we have done to other peoples and the benefit we
continue to receive from the harm done to those peoples in earlier times.
The injunction to ‘unlearn your privilege’ entails also an obligation to repair
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the harm done by unearned, and thus unfair, privilege.47 We have obligations
that come from the interdigitation of here and there. In some respects our
interests in other countries might, if properly reflected upon, serve as hostage
against our treating those distant peoples in a harmful or disrespectful way.
In early medieval Ireland, fosterage operated in something like this manner.
Children, particularly of the wealthy, would be fostered with rival, neigh-
bouring clans.48 This meant that the children were hostage against attacks
by their biological family upon their adopted family. It also meant that these
children developed emotional ties across clan boundaries.
We must understand and cultivate emotional ties of empathy and sym-
pathy across space and we can do this in part in the form of kinship
and friendship. Our neighbours’ relatives are to be found in many places.
We ourselves can befriend people in distant places either through visit-
ing, corresponding, or sponsorship. Pen pal schemes are as geopolitical as
weapons deployment. In 1940, a teacher in Danville Community School in
Des Moines, Iowa, encouraged her pupils to take up as pen pals children
from overseas and this is how in April 1940, Juanita Wagner received a letter
from a ten-year-old schoolgirl in Amsterdam by the name of Anne Frank.
In her letter, Anne wrote of looking up a map of the United States to see
where Juanita lived. In her letter to Juanita’s sister, Anne’s fourteen-year-old
sister, Margot, wrote of Netherlands ‘having a frontier with Germany and
being a small country we never feel safe.’49
Finally, if we want to talk about how geographical space is organised
around mutual dependency, we need empirical studies of how those depen-
dencies are created and then we need philosophical and legal studies of
how those dependencies can be recognised and made effective.50 In sum,
we need a space of international law and international justice. Now realist
International Relations theory pooh-poohs the idea of international law sug-
gesting that there is in effect no such thing, that the United Nations is pretty
much a waste of time.51 It seems to me that if we want to recognise inter-
dependency we have to articulate institutions to effect global justice. Some
elements of this are already there. The notion of crimes against humanity
is a developing area of international law.52 I would like to see this area of
law extended from the pursuit of war criminals to the prosecution of people
who traffic in slaves, or for egregious crimes against children. The extensions
might command general assent.
There are ways of getting nation-states to incorporate international law
into national law; part of the legislation passed by member countries of the
European Union does precisely this. In some cases states can be persuaded
to adopt as national law, international regulations because the principle
behind the regulations has such moral authority that the case for doing so is
unanswerable. If we were to seriously study the occasions of such national
alignment, we might more easily recognise opportunities for going further.
We might even find new ways of recognising the claims that distant people
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might make upon our attention, our safe-keeping, or our wealth. We might
make the right to asylum triggered by a broader range of pre-existing obliga-
tions on our part. We might develop a moral economy of migration. Justice
and law is the language that we must use when talking about how these
global interdependencies can be made ethical. In response to the shrug of
‘I don’t care,’ we need to be ready with empirical accounts that reply, ‘Well,
you should care because we have accumulated moral obligations in this way,
that way, and the other way.’ A geopolitical imaginary that talks about these
interdependencies can fuel a moral imaginary that creates the space for a dis-
cussion of global justice. And that is something that the legacy of Mackinder
would certainly preclude.
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